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WISCONSIN PRIVILEGE
DIVIDEND TAX
WILLIAM SMITH *MALLOY*
B Y SECTION 3 of Chapter 305, Laws of 1935, the Wisconsin
legislature enacted a corporate "privilege dividend tax."' The
measure, although originally designated as temporary, has been re-
tained on the statute books, and decisions surrounding it have made it
the seeming ultimate expression of the power of a state to tax without
running afoul of constitutional restrictions.2 The law has continued to
excite interest because entirely aside from questions of the substantive
law of taxation, there are bound up in the interpretations which courts
have placed on the law principles of constitutional law, canons of sta-
tutory construction, and political issues of states rights. The chronology
of the litigation will contribute to an understanding of the problems
presented to the supreme courts of the United States and of Wisconsin,
and to that end it will be briefly summarized.
The issue of the constitutionality of the tax in its application to
Wisconsin corporations was at an early date determined favorably.
a
In its application to foreign corporations doing business within the
state the question of constitutionality was presented in the leading case
of J. C. Penny v. State of Wisconsin.4 Here funds earned from opera-
tions in the state were commingled with funds derived from other
sources; and from these monies a dividend was declared and paid by
the taxpayer, a Delaware corporation, by authority of a resolution of
the board of directors meeting in New York City. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held the tax to be in nature an excise tax on the act
of privilege of receiving a dividend. On the authority of a then recent
*LLB. Marquette University, member of Wisconsin Bar, former editor of
the Marquette Law Review.
'The pertinent provisions of the act are: "(1) For the privilege of declaring
and receiving dividends out of income derived from property located and
business transacted in this state, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to three
per cent of the amount of such dividends declared and paid by all corpora-
tions (foreign and local) ... Such tax shall be deducted and withheld from
such dividends payable to residents and non residents by the payor corpora-
tion.
"(3) Every such corporation hereby made liable for such tax shall deduct
the amount of such tax from the dividends so declared." 71.60(3) Wis.
Statutes 1941.2 Dowling, CASES oN CoNsTrruT 0 oAL LAW p. 629 (1940).
3 State ex Rel Froedert Grain and Malt Company v. Tax Commission, 221 Wis.
225, 265 N.W. 672 (1936).
4 233 Wis. 286, 289 N.W. 677 (1940).
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decision of the United States Supreme Court,5 it was decided that the
act was invalid as violative of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in that it attempted to tax an act occurring outside
of the taxing jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court took jurisdiction of the case
upon certiorari at the petition of the state, and the majority decision
in its language expressly disregarded the state court's characterization
of the measure. The highest tribunal held five to four that the tax
was essentially an additional income tax upon the corporation's income
from Wisconsin sources; as such it was held valid, regardless of where
the dividend was declared or the recipients resided.6 In effect the fed-
eral court looked upon the measure as an income tax, the incidence of
which was postponed until distribution by the corporation to its stock-
holders. With this view of the nature of the measure, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin disagreed. On remander it took occasion to remark
as follows:
"The only question presented by the record on appeal was whether
the state had jurisdiction to levy the tax. The Supreme Court was not
asked to construe the statute. That is a matter under the decisions of
the Supreme Court which is clearly a function of this court, and we
must assume that the Supreme Court of the United States made its
decision in recognition of that fact. We are bound by its decision and
we yield on no other."7
The court then proceeded to express the opinion that the levy was
not an income tax, nor even a tax born by the corporation, but was a
tax payable by the stockholder upon the event of the declaration of
the dividend.
The implication of the Wisconsin Supreme Courts' remarks is that
the United States Supreme Court had extended its powers in a man-
ner never forseen by Justice Marshall when he wrote the opinion in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee," and in a manner not necessary to keep the
Federal Constitution the supreme law of the land. The vigor of Justice
Roberts' dissent, the number of cases involving every conceivable
issue collateral to the measure which have since gone to the appellate
courts, and the variety of rulings which these cases have called forth,
are added indication that the bench and bar have remained in a quan-
dary as to what questions have been finally passed on by the tribunals
in which the ultimate question of interpretation can be raised. Hesi-
5 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 S. Ct. 486,
82 L.Ed. 673 (1938) holding invalid an attempt to tax in California reinsur-
ance contracts entered into in Connecticut by a Connecticut corporation
licensed to do business in California.
6 State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 61 S. Ct. 246, 85
L.Ed. 267 (1940).
7 238 Wis. 69, 298 N.W. 186 (1941).
81 Wheaton (U.S.) 304, 4 L.E. 97 (1816).
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tancy to question a measure which the United States Supreme Court
has held inoffensive to the Constitution has coacted with a belief that
the Wisconsin and the federal tribunal approached the problem from
different and irreconcilable viewpoints. The Supreme Court's decision
in a matter in which the Wisconsin court's opinion should be final9 has
produced an aura of indecision which only judicial redetermination of
the validity of the law as a whole can remove.
It is submitted that the approach to the problem best calculated to
dispel the mists is to determine what each court had the right to do,
and what it assumed to do when the case was initially before it. In
this connection, it is an over-simplification of the problem to say that
the United States Supreme Court radically changed the right of the
state to tax an incident outside of its borders, or that it disregarded
established principles and went behind the interpretation which the
state courts affixed to the law.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court remarked, the construction of a
state statute is normally a matter for the court of last resort of a
state.' The interpretation, when made, becomes part of the law and is
binding on the federal courts to the extent that when a case involving
the application of the law is before the federal courts, the law will be
applied as interpreted by the state courts.10 Furthermore, if its con-
stitutionality is assailed, the Supreme Court of the United States must
look to the measure as interpreted, rather than appeal to consideration
of what the law might be if the state court had decided otherwise.
It is perhaps the normal situation that the highest tribunal is not
afforded an opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality under the
federal Constitution of an ambiguous measure until the ambiguities
have been resolved by a decision in the state courts of last resort.
This need not, however, be the case. The United States Code pro-
vides six methods of bringing before the United States Supreme Court
a state statute assailed as unconstitutional," and the remedy by appeal
and certiorari from the state appellate tribunals are only two of the
methods. Consequently, it is possible that a measure, even though
ambiguous may finally reach the highest federal court neither extended
or restricted by binding state court interpretations- of the law. A third
alternative is possible if the measure is unambiguous or if it is so con-
sidered by the state courts. In such a situation, an interpretation may be
neither necessary or helpful. In the progress of litigation in courts
inferior to the United States Supreme Court, the statute might be
9 Union Pacific R. R. v. Board of Comm. of Weld County, 247 U.S. 282, 38
S. Ct. 510, 62 L.Ed. 1110 (1918).
10 Zalatuka v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 90 F. (2d) 230 (C.C.A. 7th,
from Wisconsin) ; 14 Am. jurisprudence 314, and cases there cited.
1128 U.S.C.A. 380; 28 U.S.C.A. 344 (a) and (b); 28 U.S.C.A. 347 (a) and
(b) ; 28 U.S.C.A. 380.
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merely characterized as a measure of a particular nature and hence
held to be constitutional or unconstitutional. The mere fact that deci-
sions have been rendered in the state courts in cases in which the
measure was involved does not necessarily mean that the law has been
interpreted.
When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional (1) a law pre-
iously determined by the state courts to have a given meaning and
then appealed on federal grounds, or (2) one which the state courts
have not interpreted, and the Supreme Court holds it unconstitutional
on its face, it is competent for the state courts on remand to save the
law as constitutional by revising their earlier opinion in the light of
the mandate. 12 This power is hedged with restrictions: the interpreta-
tion of the United States Supreme Court mandate presents a federal
question on which that tribunal may again pass; 13 and the second
guess of the state court is without prejudice to a subsequent review
by the highest tribunal of the law as then in force.14 The rule is further
subject to an exception in that it will not be applied in cases in which
a law before the United States Supreme Court is declared constitu-
tional only if interpreted in a given way.15
Another principle which comes into play in a discussion of what the
two courts assumed to do in the Penney case is the canon of construc-
tion that when a statute is ambiguous, the court interpreting it shall
place upon the law an interpretation which will if possible save its con-
stitutionality. This is upon the theory that the legislature intended to
enact a valid law, and that a duty devolves upon the court to resolve
all ambiguities in such way as to implement that intent. As witness to
the fact that courts will be especially tender of a law before it when it
is the unconstrued statute of another jurisdiction, following language
from a case in the Federal courts is pertinent:
"In the absence of a construction of a statute by a state
court, the Supreme Court of the United States, unless obliged
to do so should not adopt the construction which might render
the statute of doubtful validity, but should await a determination
of the matter by the state court."'1 -
It is the thesis of this paper that there is common ground on which
the present holdings of the state and Federal courts can be reconciled
without violence to accepted principles governing the respective prov-
inces of either court. This process of reconciliation-must begin with a
12 McGoldrick v. Compaigne Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 60 S. Ct.
512, 84 L.Ed. 849 (1939).
13 U. S. v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, Mo., 35 S. Ct. 408, 236 U.S. 194,
59 L.Ed. 535 (1915).
14 Wade v. Travis County, 174 U.S. 499, 19 S. Ct. 715, 43 L.Ed. 1060 (1899).
15 Richey v. Cleveland R. Co., 93 N.E. 1022, 47 Ind. App. 123 (1911).
"I Stephenson v. Birnford, 287 U.S. 251, 53 S. Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288 (1932).
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careful delineation between "interpretation" of a state statute and
mere "classification" or "characterization" of a measure.17 From the
discussion above, it is apparent that the first function is the function
of the state courts and as such is conclusive on the federal courts. But
the same is not true of the latter function, if function it may be called.
If it can be said that a court of last resort in a state was pursuing the
latter course alone, its expression would not be treated as binding by
the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal. It is 'ubmitted that
the Wisconsin court's action fell in the latter class,1 thus leaving the
United States Supreme Court free to perform the state court's func-
tion; and it devolved on the former tribunal to save the law by con-
struction of the ambiguities if it could do so.
In this coilnection an examination of both the majority and minority
opinions in the United States Supreme Court's handling of the Penney
case at the very least permits an inference that the court placed the
opinion of the state tribunals in the latter category. Such inference
runs like a thread through both opinions bu the following are indica-
tive of the court's attitude.
From the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
"Ascertainment of the scope of the exaction-what is in-
cluded in it-is for the state court. But the descriptive pigeon-
hole into which a state court puts a tax is of no moment in
determining the constitutional significance of the exaction."
and from the minority opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts:
"I concur.., in the view that in testing the constitutionality
of an exaction, this court examines for itself the nature and
incidence of the tax and disregards mere names and distinctive
ephithets. With this principle, Ihave no quarrel... "
The language is more consistent with recognition of -such a dis-
tinction than it is with the implied overruling of a long established rule
of law. So it seems no wild assumption to say that neither the writer of
the majority or of the dissenting opinion looked upon the action of the
Wisconsin court as an interpretation of the tax legislation. That the
right of the appellate court depended on the answer to a question of
fact, and that much evidence supports a contrary view of which the
Wisconsin court did not demand a contrary view.
Since the federal court took this view, and earlier remarks of the
Wisconsin court were mere dicta on the subject of the applicability of
the tax to foreign corporations it would seem that the federal court
could actually fix an interpretation upon the law.
17 Broderick v. Marcus, 261 N.Y.S. 625, 146 Misc. 240 (1933).
18 Marion v. Weiser, 196 N.Y.S. 386, 119 Misc. 412 (1922).
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Its function in such circumstances should be similar to those exer-
cised by the state court. If the law could be saved by a constitutional
interpretation it devolved upon the United States Supreme Court to so
construe the ambiguities. That the law is ambiguous to the point where
judicial clarification was needed is apparent from the fact that it lays
a tax on "the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends . . ."; and
this concept involves not only two distinct acts, but the taxable acts
are the acts of different parties. The majority opinion, that the tax was
in nature an additional income tax, was intended neither as a usurpa-
tion of the state court's power to interpret the statute nor an exten-
sion of the power of the state to tax; and it entirely mooted the point
of which Justice Rosenberry deemed it decisive.19 The right of the
lower federal courts to do so when an interpretation is necessary to
the decision of a federal question properly before it has since been
expressly established in the recent case of Meredith v. Winter Haven,0
in which it was said with reference to a problem somewhat akin to
those involved'in the Penney case, that "the case of Erie Railroad
Company v. Toinkins"' did not free the federal courts from the duty of
deciding questions of state law .... Instead it placed on them a greater
responsibility for determining and applying state law in all cases within
their jurisdiction. Accepting this responsibility (as was its duty), this
Court has not hesitated to decide questions of state law when necessary
for the disposition of a case brought to it for decision, although the
highest court of the state had not answered them, the answers were
difficult, and the character of the answer which the highest state courts
might ultimately give remained uncertain." No logical reason appears
why the same language is not applicable to a case properly before
the United States Supreme Court.
The facts on which the above decisions rest show that the Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida in a diversity of citizenship case, the
ground for dismissal being that the state law which the federal court
was bound to apply was not clearly settled and stable. The language of
the Supreme Court indicates that though spoken in a case involving
citizens of various states, the same holding would a fortiori apply to
cases in which a federal question was involved.
If Wisconsin had not interpreted the law, the United States
Supreme Court was free to do so, and it did. The logical question is
what effect the decision in the United States Supreme Court must be
given. To this, Meredith v. Winter Haven, above cited, supplies an
answer which does not, however, coincide with the conclusions which
19 See footnote 7.
20 88 L.Ed. 1 (Advance Sheets Nov. 22, 1943).
21304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
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the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached in its opinion on the remand
of the case. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
operated as an adjudication of the respective rights of the litigants
before it and became the law of the case; but it had no effect what-
soever on the final meaning assigned by the state courts to the statute.
The basis of the Wisconsin Court's opinion was that the United
States Supreme Court's holding finally determined the constitutionality
of the measure though its incidence were declared to be on the out-of-
state receiver of dividends. The writer regards the federal decision as
merely adjudicating the rights of the parties and expressing the thought
of the majority that the measure could be so construed that the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution would not be violated.
It neither constrains the state court to adopt the interpretation nor
precludes the federal court from again inquiring into the interpretation
which the state did adopt, when the latter question is properly raised.
In the three and one-half years which have elapsed since the Penney
Company decision, authority in both the state and federal courts have
grown up around the problem.
In the state court, it has been held squarely that the tax is one upon
the stockholder receiving dividends and not upon the corporation pay-
ing them ;22 that ,the stockholder may not sue to collect from the cor-
poration the amount of the tax withheld from the dividend ;23 and that,
the exaction being upon the stockholder, the corporation can not deduct
the amount thereof as an expense of doing business on its Wisconsin
tax return. 24 The federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin held the tax to be a tax on the corporation 25 but its holding
was reversed in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,26 in an opinion
which relied on the Wisconsin court's interpretation in Blied v. Wis-
consin Foundry and Machine Company. Finally the Tax Court of the
United States reversed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and held
the Wisconsin tax, if paid by the corporation, deductible as a business
expense in filing a federal tax return.17 In effect, this amounts to a
holding that the tax is a tax on the corporation and deductible as such.
Since appeal from the Tax court lies to the Circuit Court of Appeals
22 International Harvester v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, Wis. Supreme
Ct. June 16, 1943, (C.C.H. Tax Service par. 19-052) which should also be
consulted for its statement of the present position of the Wisconsin Court.23 Blied v. Wisconsin Foundry and Machine Co., 243 Wis. 221, 10 N.W. (2d)
142 (1943).
24 Wisconsin Gas and Electric Co., et al. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation,
243 Wis. 216, 10 N.W. (2d) 140 (1943).
25 Wisconsin Gas and Electric Co., et al. v. U. S. (D.C. E.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 1943.
C. C. H. Tax Service par. 19-013).
26Wisconsin Gas and Electric Co., et al. v. U.S. (C.C.A. 7th, Nov. 8, 1943.
C. C. H. Tax Service par. 19-060).
27 Montreal Mining Co. v. Commissioner 2 T. C., No. 85 (Sept. 16, 1943).
19443
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of the Circuit in which lies the office of the Collector with whom the
return was filed, unless both parties stipulate otherwise,28 it seems
certain that appeal will result in reversal of the Tax Court's holding
as well.
By its own statement in International Harvester Company v. De-
partment of Taxation, supra, the Wisconsin court deems the issue of
constitutionality closed, and all issues decided in favor of a widened
power of the states to tax transactions beyond their borders. The
character of the tax is now fixed by the state court; the error, if error
was made, was in deeming that the Supreme Court had passed upon
the constitutionality of the measure as now interpreted. Rectification
can only be made by the Supreme Court of the United States by a deci-
sion on the constitutionality of the measure as interpreted. It would
seem that certainty in the law would demand submission of the question
at as early a date as possible. The quickest method of obtaining review
would be by suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute before a three-
judge federal district court, with immediate and direct appeal from the
District court to the Supreme Court.2"
2826 U.S.C.A. 1141 (1).
2928 U.S.C.A. 380.
